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Much is understood about loss aversion (the tendency for losses to have greater hedonic impact than comparable gains), but open questions
remain. First, there is debate about whether loss aversion is best understood as the byproduct of a single system within the brain that treats losses
and gains asymmetrically or the interaction of separate deliberative and emotional systems. Second, some have questioned whether loss aversion
alone is the best account for the endowment effect. Alternative accounts, based on the differential focus induced by buying versus selling, the
order in which buyers and sellers consider positive and negative aspects of the good, the extent to which ownership induces liking, and the desire
to avoid making a bad deal, have been proposed. Third, it is unclear whether losses are actually experienced more intensely than comparable gains,
or whether people simply behave as if they were. Some have argued that loss aversion is nothing more than an affective forecasting error, while
others have argued that there are many situations in which losses are actually more impactful than comparable gains. This review synthesizes the
insights that behavioral researchers and neuroeconomists have contributed to each debate, and highlights potential avenues for future research.
© 2010 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Loss aversion; Neuroeconomics; Decision-making; Endowment effect; Prospect theory; fMRIThe young field of neuroeconomics is evolving quickly. Its
birth, in the late 1990s, was arguably inauspicious from a
theoretical standpoint. Many of the early neuroeconomic studies
were unapologetically atheoretical and exploratory, searching
for any neural activation differences across conditions.1
However, as insights from exploratory studies cumulate, and
methodological sophistication and diversity increase, neuroe-
conomics is beginning to produce findings of theoretical
interest. Additionally, neuroeconomics has begun to abandon
its near-exclusive reliance on functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) data (which are correlational) in favor ofE-mail address: srick@umich.edu.
1 In the early neuroeconomics literature, it was not uncommon for researchers
to indicate that their research was “directly broadly to look for any significant
activation differences” between conditions (Ambler, Braeutigam, Stins, Rose, &
Swithenby, 2004, p. 251) or to hypothesize that their manipulation would “result
in observed differences in process as reflected in both response time as well as
brain scans” (Dickhaut et al., 2003, p. 3538).
1057-7408/$ - see front matter © 2010 Society for Consumer Psychology. Publish
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2010.04.004utilizing multiple methods to better determine causality (e.g.,
Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005).
The potential payoff of neuroeconomics has been debated
in several different fields (see Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr &
Poldrack (2008) for an excellent review of the brief history of
neuroeconomics). Perhaps the most visible and heated debate
has been within economics, with some economists arguing for
the transformative potential of neuroeconomics (Camerer, 2007;
Camerer, Loewenstein,&Prelec, 2005) and others arguing to keep
economics “mindless” (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2008; cf. Harrison,
2008). The spate of neuroeconomics-inspired models that have
recently emerged in the economics literature (e.g., Benhabib &
Bisin, 2005; Bernheim & Rangel, 2004; Brocas & Carrillo, 2008;
Caplin&Dean, 2007; Fudenberg&Levine, 2006; Loewenstein&
O'Donoghue, 2004) presumably argue in favor of the former
perspective. The extent to which neuroeconomics can inform
consumer research (Egidi, Nusbaum &, Cacioppo, 2008), neuro-
science (Camerer, 2008; Zak, 2004), psychology (Loewenstein,
Rick &, Cohen, 2008), public policy (Hoffman, 2004), and basic
business practices (Shane, 2009) has also been considered.ed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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minate topics of interest to consumer researchers has already
been answered affirmatively to some extent, as illustrated by the
fMRI-based studies recently published in marketing journals
(e.g., Dietvorst et al., 2009; Hedgcock & Rao, 2009; Yoon,
Gutchess, Feinberg, & Polk, 2006). Outside of marketing
journals, neuroeconomists have investigated several topics of
interest to consumer researchers, such as spending decisions
(Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007), in-
vestment decisions (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), the price pla-
cebo effect (Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008),
charitable giving (Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007), time
discounting (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004),
and self-control (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009).
One phenomenon that has been of particular interest to
both consumer researchers (e.g., Ariely, Huber, &Wertenbroch,
2005; Camerer, 2005; Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Zhang &
Fishbach, 2005) and neuroeconomists is loss aversion, which
refers to the tendency for losses to have greater hedonic impact
than comparable gains. Although much is known about loss
aversion, open questions about the nature of loss aversion
remain (Johnson, Gachter, & Herrmann, 2006). This review
considers questions regarding the nature of loss aversion that
have recently been raised (and, to varying degrees, answered) in
the behavioral and neuroeconomic literatures.
Loss aversion: a brief history
The notion that losses loom larger than gains, originally for-
malized byKahneman and Tversky (1979; Tversky&Kahneman,
1991; cf. Markowitz, 1952, p. 155), has proven to have
tremendous explanatory power. In risky contexts, loss aversion
can help to explain widespread risk aversion (e.g., Kahneman &
Lovallo, 1993), as well as the St. Petersburg Paradox (Camerer,
2005). In riskless contexts, loss aversion is routinely invoked to
explain the “endowment effect” (Thaler, 1980), which refers to the
tendency for people to value an object more highly when they
possess it than they would value the same object if they did not
possess it. In addition to these basic examples, loss aversion
can help to explain a wide range of phenomena, including the sunk
cost fallacy, the attraction effect, the compromise effect,
anticipated and experienced regret (Kardes, 1994), the status
quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), brand choice (Hardie,
Johnson, & Fader, 1993), labor supply (Camerer, Babcock,
Loewenstein, & Thaler, 1997), the equity premium puzzle
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1995), organ donation decisions (Johnson &
Goldstein, 2003), incumbency biases in elections (Quattrone
&Tversky, 1988), and the greater tendency to cheat on one's taxes
when money is owed than when one is due for a refund
(Schepanski & Shearer, 1995).22 Erev and colleagues (e.g., Erev et al., 2008; Ert & Erev, 2010) question the
explanatory power of loss aversion and the robustness of the phenomenon itself.
For example, Ert and Erev (2010, p. 5) argue that “participants do not exhibit loss
aversion in short studies, or at the beginning of long studies, but, in certain studies,
they act as if they become loss averse over time.” It is difficult to reconcile this
claim with previous research. Endowment effect experiments, for example,
typically only elicit a single decision from owners and non-owners.Although loss aversion has proven to be a remarkably robust
phenomenon, several important moderators have been identified.
Loss aversion for goods increases with duration of ownership
(Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998), though loss aversion has
been observed even in the absence of ownership (Carmon,
Wertenbroch, & Zeelenberg, 2003). Some evidence indicates that
loss aversion is attenuated or reversed for money or goods already
earmarked for exchange (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005),
gambles involving small amounts of money (Harnick, Van
Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007), gambles whose probabil-
ities are not stated explicitly, but instead inferred over time from
outcome feedback (Erev, Ert, & Yechiam, 2008), unattractive
goods (Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, & Bilgin, 2007), and goods
consisting of several units (Burson, Faro, & Rottenstreich, 2009).
Sellers with extensive marketplace experience (e.g., List, 2003) or
influenced by incidental sadness (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein,
2004) or positive mood (Zhang & Fishbach, 2005) also tend to
exhibit reduced loss aversion. Although situational factors clearly
influence loss aversion, Gachter, Johnson and Herrmann (2007)
found that individuals chronically differ in the extent to which
they are loss-averse and that these individual differences are fairly
stable across risky and riskless contexts.
Clearly, much is understood about loss aversion. Still, open
questions remain. For example, there is debate (primarily
among neuroeconomists) about whether loss aversion, as well
as several other decision-making phenomena, is the byproduct
of a single system or the interaction of multiple systems within
the brain. Some propose that losses evoke an over-learned fear
response that overrides deliberative assessments, while others
argue that loss aversion is adequately explained by a single
system that treats gains and losses asymmetrically.
Additionally, behavioral researchers have begun to question
whether loss aversion is the best account for the endowment
effect. Several alternative accounts, based on the differential
focus induced by buying versus selling, the order in which
buyers and sellers consider positive and negative aspects of
the good, the extent to which ownership induces liking, and
the desire to avoid making a bad deal, have been proposed.
Neuroeconomists, by contrast, have only recently begun to
explore the neural correlates of the endowment effect.
Finally, both behavioral researchers and neuroeconomists
have investigated whether losses are actually experienced more
intensely than comparable gains, or whether people simply
behave as if they were. Loss-averse decisions alone do not
shed light on whether losses are actually more impactful than
comparable gains, so researchers have begun to examine the
experienced (dis)utility of losses and gains.
I organize this review around these ongoing debates,
synthesizing the complementary contributions from behavioral
and neuroeconomic research, and highlighting possible avenues
for future research.
Is loss aversion a byproduct of multiple systems interacting
in the brain?
Perhaps the most hotly debated topic within neuroeconomics
is whether decision-making phenomena such as loss aversion
Fig. 1. Simplified sketches of the human cerebrum, from lateral (side) and medial (midline) perspectives. The images highlight the location of the amygdala, insula, and
striatum, regions that are most often the focus of neuroeconomic studies of loss aversion. Other regions are identified to provide context. Images adapted from Cohen
(2005).
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tems within the brain. Dual-system theories have been invoked
to explain loss aversion (Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein,
2005; Camerer, 2005), with the general idea being that the
aversive response to loss stemming from the “hot” affective
system tends to override the more objective evaluation per-
formed by the “cool” deliberative system. Beyond loss aversion,
distinct systems have been invoked to explain a variety of
phenomena in consumer research (e.g., Lee, Amir, & Ariely,
2009; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2005), psychology (e.g.,
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000), and
economics (e.g., Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; Loewenstein &
O'Donoghue, 2004).3
The extent to which such theories can be reconciled with
the way the brain actually operates is debatable (e.g., Johnson,
2008). Keren and Schul (2009) argue that the existing evidence
from neuroscience is too ambiguous to support either the single
or multiple systems perspective. Neuroeconomists have rapidly
contributed much new evidence to the debate, though this
evidence is not devoid of interpretational ambiguity.4
In one of the seminal papers in neuroeconomics, McClure
et al. (2004) provided fMRI evidence suggestive of separate
systems interacting to influence impatience. Participants in
their study made a series of choices between small proximal
rewards and larger delayed rewards (e.g., receive a $5 gift
certificate immediately or a $10 gift certificate in 2 weeks). In
some trials the proximal reward was available immediately,
and in other trials it was not (i.e., participants chose between
two delayed rewards). McClure et al. (2004) found that lim-3 Keren and Schul (2009) utilize a computer analogy to highlight the
distinction between systems and processes, concepts that are often (mis)used
interchangeably. They propose that processes resemble the operations
performed by software and that systems more closely resemble the hardware.
Accordingly, I omit from the above list work that has proposed dual-process
accounts of behavior (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999).
4 A discussion of how neural activity is measured and transformed into
interpretable data is beyond the scope of this review. Many relevant references
are available for interested readers (e.g., Buxton, 2002; Egidi et al., 2008;
Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2004; Logothetis, 2008; the Appendix in Yoon et
al., 2006).bic and paralimbic cortical structures known to be rich in
dopaminergic innervation and highly sensitive to the anticipa-
tion and experience of reward (e.g., the ventral striatum, the
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and the posterior cingulate
cortex; see Fig. 1) were significantly more active in trials
involving an immediate reward than in trials where both
rewards were delayed. By contrast, fronto-parietal regions that
support higher cognitive functions (e.g., the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex) were activated about equally for both types of
decisions. Moreover, McClure et al. (2004) found that when
decisions involved an immediate reward, greater activity in
fronto-parietal regions than in limbic regions predicted the
selection of larger, delayed rewards. This difference disap-
peared (and flipped slightly) when participants chose immediate
rewards. McClure et al. (2004) interpreted the results as a neural
reflection of Laibson's (1997) beta–delta model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting: when the patient delta (fronto-parietal)
regions exerted greater influence than the impulsive beta
(limbic) regions, participants tended to select the larger, delayed
reward.5
However, the McClure et al. (2004) results were not
universally interpreted as reflecting the interaction of separate
systems in the brain (e.g., Ainslie & Monterosso, 2004;
Glimcher, Kable, & Louie, 2007). Kable and Glimcher (2007)
most forcefully argued against such a perspective. In their fMRI
study, participants made a series of choices between receiving
$20 immediately and receiving a larger delayed amount of
money. Only the length of the delay and amount of the larger
reward varied across trials; the immediate $20 option was held
constant across trials. Kable and Glimcher (2007) found that
activation in the beta regions identified by McClure et al. (2004)
correlated negatively with the length of the delay and positively
with both the size of the delayed reward and choices of it instead
of the immediate reward. Kable and Glimcher (2007) thus
proposed that activation in these beta regions encodes the5 McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein and Cohen (2007) later replicated
these results with rewards that, unlike gift certificates, could actually be
delivered and consumed immediately in the scanner (juice or water). See also
Hariri et al. (2006).
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findings with the McClure et al. (2004) findings by noting that
the subjective value of immediate rewards is particularly high,
which could explain why McClure et al. (2004) observed
preferential activation in beta regions when immediate rewards
were available. The Kable and Glimcher (2007) findings
strongly challenge the multiple systems perspective, though it
is worth highlighting that their experimental design did not
manipulate whether or not immediacy was an option (partici-
pants could always select an immediate reward). Because
participants never chose between two delayed rewards, it is
difficult to definitively rule out the hypothesis that the valuation
process is qualitatively different when immediacy is an option.
Tom, Fox, Trepel and Poldrack (2007) also argued against
a multiple systems perspective in their investigation of the
neural basis of loss aversion. In their fMRI study, participants
made a series of accept/reject decisions for mixed gambles
(offering an equal probability of winning or losing money).
If loss aversion is driven by negative affect, as some have
speculated (e.g., Camerer, 2005), positive correlations between
the size of the potential loss and activation in brain regions
commonly associated with the experience of negative affect
(such as the amygdala or anterior insula; see Fig. 1) should be
observed. However, Tom et al. (2007) found that no brain
regions displayed significant positive correlations with the size
of the potential loss. Rather, activation in a group of regions
including the dorsal and ventral striatum and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (dopaminergic targets that overlap somewhat
with the beta regions discussed above), correlated positively
with the size of the potential gain and negatively with the size of
the potential loss. Critically, these regions demonstrated neural
loss aversion: The reduction in activation in response to losses
was greater than the increase in activation in response to
comparable gains for nearly all participants. Additionally, the
asymmetric responses to losses and gains in several regions,
including the ventral striatum, strongly correlated with be-
havioral loss aversion. Although some question whether the
current results rule out negative affect as a driver of loss
aversion because of the asymmetric difficulty in picking up loss
as opposed to gain signals with fMRI (Knutson & Greer, 2008),
the results are more readily interpreted as evidence against the
multiple systems perspective.6
De Martino, Camerer and Adolphs (2010) recently offered
contradictory evidence. Their study utilized two adult partici-
pants who, due to an extremely rare genetic disease known as
Urbach–Wiethe disease, had bilateral focal (selective) lesions
of the amygdala. Both adults have difficultly processing fear,
but otherwise have normal cognitive skills and IQ. Each
participant was compared to a control group of six healthy
adults matched on age, gender, income, and education. As in6 Consistent with Tom et al. (2007), Tremeau et al. (2008) found that
individuals with schizophrenia were significantly less likely than non-patient
controls to demonstrate loss aversion in a hypothetical buying and selling task.
Schizophrenia has long been hypothesized to be associated with disruption of
the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine systems that project to the areas
that demonstrated neural loss aversion in Tom et al. (2007).Tom et al. (2007), participants made a series of accept/reject
decisions for mixed gambles. This was a strictly behavioral
study: decisions were made outside the scanner. Non-lesion
control participants exhibited typical levels of behavioral loss
aversion, but neither amygdala-damaged participant exhibited
loss aversion. A supplemental study examining risk attitudes
over gains (e.g., choices between receiving x for sure and
flipping a coin to win nothing or 2x) revealed that the amygdala-
damaged participants had similar levels of risk aversion as the
non-lesion controls, suggesting that the difference between the
two groups is restricted to their reactions to losses.
The results thus conflict with those of Tom et al. (2007),
despite utilization of a similar paradigm. One possible source of
the divergence is the range of gamble outcomes in the two
studies. In Tom et al. (2007), possible gains ranged from +$10
to +$40, and possible losses ranged from −$5 to −$20; most
gambles had a positive expected value. In De Martino et al.
(2010), possible gains ranged from +$20 to +$50 and possible
losses ranged from −$20 to −$50. Thus, it is possible that the
losses were not severe enough in Tom et al. to elicit a detectable
amygdala reaction. Unfortunately, De Martino et al. (2010)
did not include gambles with small losses, which could have
helped to reconcile the two studies (if the amygdala-damaged
participants and non-lesion controls behaved more similarly
when losses are small). De Martino et al. (2010) speculated
that the amygdala may initially generate a (difficult-to-measure)
aversive response that is then conveyed to the value-sensitive
brain structures that correlated asymmetrically with gains and
losses in Tom et al. (2007).
Behavioral research could contribute to this debate. Ex-
amining whether methods commonly used to manipulate the
strength or influence of deliberative versus emotional re-
sponses, such as cognitive load (e.g., Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999)
or priming feelings versus deliberation (e.g., Hsee & Rotten-
streich, 2004), moderate loss aversion would be informative.
Is loss aversion the best explanation for the
endowment effect?
The endowment effect is most commonly defined as the
difference between the minimum amount of money one is
willing to accept to part with an owned good (selling price) and
the maximum amount of money one is willing to pay to buy the
good (buying price). Because buyers and sellers are in slightly
different wealth positions, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1990) introduced a “choice” condition, whereby people make a
series of choices between receiving a good and receiving an
amount of money. The amount of money at which participants
are indifferent between receiving it and receiving the good is
the choice price. Because sellers and choosers are in identical
positions (both are deciding whether to leave the lab with the
money or the good), any difference between selling prices and
choice prices is a pure framing effect. Typically, selling prices
are significantly greater than choice prices, which tend to be
only slightly and non-significantly greater than buying prices
(Kahneman et al., 1990; but see Bateman, Kahneman, Munro,
Starmer, & Sugden, 2005). In this section, I will use the term
457S. Rick / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 453–463“endowment effect” to describe both the difference between
selling and buying prices and the difference between selling and
choice prices.
The endowment effect is typically interpreted as a manifes-
tation of loss aversion. However, a variety of alternative
explanations have also been proposed. Carmon and Ariely
(2000), for example, proposed that people tend to focus onwhat is
foregone in a potential transaction. Thus, buying prices are based
largely on the pain of parting with the money, and selling prices
are based largely on the pain of parting with the good. Indeed,
Carmon and Ariely (2000) found that selling prices for basketball
tickets weremore sensitive to aspects of the game (e.g., whether it
was a championship game) and that buying prices were more
sensitive to monetary aspects (e.g., the retail price of the tickets).
Later, query theory (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007)
proposed that value is constructed based on a series of queries
whose order is role-dependent. Sellers begin by calling to mind
“value-increasing” aspects: positive aspects of the good and
negative aspects of acquiring money (e.g., it would not be
enough to buy something better). Buyers (or choosers) begin by
calling tomind “value-decreasing” aspects: positive aspects of the
money and negative aspects of the good (cf. Nayakankuppam &
Mishra, 2005). Because aspects that are initially recalled tend to
interfere with the retrieval of subsequent aspects, the order in
which the queries are executed matters. Thus, owners tend to
arrive at higher valuations of the good than non-owners. Indeed,
Johnson et al. (2007) eliminated the endowment effect by
reversing the typical order of queries (i.e., forcing sellers to begin
by listing value-decreasing aspects and choosers to begin by
listing value-increasing aspects). It is worth noting that query
theory is not necessarily incompatible with loss aversion, but
instead proposes a process that may give rise to it.
Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert and Wilson (2009), by contrast,
abandon loss aversion as an explanation completely, instead
proposing that it is ownership that causes the endowment effect
(cf. Beggan, 1992; Beggan & Allison, 1997; Peck & Shu, 2009;
Reb & Connolly, 2007; but see Barone, Shimp, & Sprott,
1997a,b). The argument is that people like what they own,
regardless of how they came to own it, because owned items
become associated with the self. Morewedge et al. (2009)
therefore attempted to unconfound ownership and the prospect
of loss, which are typically confounded in the real world and in
the lab. For example, in one experiment, selling and choice
prices for a mug were elicited in typical fashion. Additionally,
in a novel “owner–buyer” condition, choosers who had already
been endowed with a mug stated their choice price for a second,
identical mug. Sellers stated significantly greater prices than
non-endowed choosers, replicating the endowment effect. The
choice prices of owner–buyers were statistically indistinguish-
able from selling prices. Although it is worth highlighting that
sellers and owner–buyers were not making identical decisions
(sellers were deciding whether to leave with one mug or money;
owner–buyers were deciding whether to leave with two mugs or
one mug plus money), the results do suggest that ownership-
induced liking contributes to the endowment effect.
Another account of the endowment effect is based on
transaction disutility, or the desire to avoid making a bad deal(e.g., Brown, 2005). Weaver and Frederick (2008) argue
that because reference prices typically exceed the extent to
which consumers value products, sellers who price goods at
their subjective valuation face the prospect of selling at a loss.
For example, if a mug retails for $8, but is only valued at $2,
selling it at one's valuation results in a $6 loss relative to the
reference price. Buyers, by contrast, could generally offer their
valuation without making a bad deal. Consistent with this
account, Weaver and Frederick (2008) found that selling prices
were particularly sensitive to information about reference
(retail) prices (cf. Simonson & Drolet, 2004; but see Carmon
& Ariely, 2000).
More exotic accounts have also been proposed. Gal (2006),
for example, proposed that “a propensity to remain at the status
quo” is sufficient to account for the endowment effect (i.e.,
sellers wish to maintain ownership and buyers wish to maintain
non-ownership). However, this proposal cannot account for the
basic observation that choosers (who choose between receiving
the good and receiving money, and thus have no default option)
routinely set choice prices that are significantly lower than
selling prices. Plott and Zeiler (2005) attributed the endowment
effect to “subject misconceptions” about experimental proce-
dures. Subsequent research has revealed that dropping partici-
pants who misunderstand the task actually strengthens the
endowment effect (Johnson et al., 2007). Later, Plott and Zeiler
(2007) proposed a number of additional artifactual sources,
such as “the regard subjects have for the experimenter” (p. 1462).
Neuroeconomists have only recently begun to examine the
endowment effect, and these early studies were primarily
designed to identify basic neural correlates, rather than to dis-
tinguish between different competing explanations. However,
the exploratory results are still informative. Weber et al. (2007)
conducted the first fMRI study of the endowment effect.
Participants were endowed with digital copies of songs. On
some trials, they were asked to state selling prices for their
endowed songs, and on other trials, they were asked to state
buying prices for different songs. Weber et al. (2007) observed
significantly greater amygdala activation during the selling
trials than during the buying trials. At first blush, the results
appear consistent with the argument that loss aversion reflects
an over-learned fear response to losses (e.g., Camerer, 2005).
However, the authors did not examine whether activation in the
amygdala predicted buying and selling prices, so it is unclear
whether amygdala activation actually played any role in the
decision-making process.
Knutson et al. (2008) conducted an fMRI study of the
endowment effect, using high-value consumer goods (e.g., an
iPod Shuffle). Participants were initially endowed with two
goods and with money. There were three types of trials: selling,
buying, and choosing. In the selling trials, participants were
offered prices for their owned goods and made a series of binary
selling (sell or keep) decisions. In the buying trials, participants
were offered two other goods and made a series of purchase
(buy or do not buy) decisions. In the choosing trials, participants
were presented with two other goods and made a series of
choices between receiving the good and receiving money. One
choice for each of the six goods counted for real, meaning the
458 S. Rick / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 453–463experiment was quite lucrative for participants. Consistent with
Kahneman et al. (1990), selling prices were significantly greater
than choice prices, which were slightly greater than buying
prices. The behavioral results suggest that the endowment effect
is not limited to small-stakes goods.
At the neural level, Knutson et al. (2008) found that
activation in the MPFC in response to prices varied across
conditions. Specifically, MPFC activation correlated negatively
with prices in the buying and choosing conditions (though the
negative correlation was particularly strong in the buying
condition), and positively with prices in the selling conditions.
The MPFC activation differences across choosing and selling
conditions reflects a pure framing effect in the brain. The
differences are also consistent with prior work demonstrating
that MPFC activation is positively correlated with gains and
negatively correlated with losses (e.g., Knutson, Fong, Bennett,
Adams, & Hommer, 2003).
Knutson et al. (2008) also found some support for the notion
that distress contributes to the endowment effect. Because
participants never bought and sold the same product, two
estimates of the endowment effect were computed. A “scanned”
(between-subjects) estimate was equal to the difference between
the selling price elicited in the scanner and the average buying
and choosing price for the same product among the other
subjects. A “postscan” (within-subject) estimate was the dif-
ference between hypothetical buying and selling prices for
the same product elicited after the scanning session. Knutson
et al. (2008) found that activation in right insula while con-
templating selling owned goods correlated positively and sig-
nificantly with both estimates of the endowment effect. The
insula tends to be active when anticipating distress and actually
experiencing distressing events, such as unfair ultimatum game
offers (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) or
social exclusion (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003).
Insula activation also correlates positively with subjective
ratings of distress (Masten et al., 2009). Thus, the positive
correlations between insula activation and estimates of the en-
dowment effect arguably suggest that the more distress par-
ticipants feel when contemplating parting with owned goods,
the more susceptible they are to the endowment effect.
De Martino, Kumaran, Holt and Dolan (2009) recently
conducted an fMRI study of the endowment effect in which
subjects bought and sold identical lottery tickets. The task was
complicated (one-fourth of the sample had to be dropped for
misunderstanding the instructions), but addressed a limitation of
Knutson et al. (2008), who did not elicit within-subject
endowment effects in the scanner. Consistent with Knutson
et al. (2008), DeMartino et al. (2009) found that insula activation
correlated with the size of the endowment effect. However, it is
worth noting that not all results were consistent with Knutson
et al. (2008): for example, De Martino et al. also found that
bilateral ventral striatum activation correlated with the size of the
endowment effect, which Knutson et al. did not find.
Despite important methodological and empirical differences
across papers, these exploratory fMRI studies generally support
the premise that distress contributes to the endowment effect.
Clearly, however, behavioral researchers have made most of theprogress toward understanding what truly drives the endow-
ment effect (or at least toward articulating the endowment
effect's multiple determinants). Thus, there is a need for more
focused fMRI designs that pit some of the nuanced explanations
for the endowment effect against one another.
Are losses actually experienced more intensely than gains?
Behavior in both risky and riskless contexts routinely reveals
that individuals treat losses as if they were more impactful than
comparable gains. However, loss-averse decisions alone do
not shed light on whether losses are actually experienced more
intensely than comparable gains or whether losses are simply
predicted to be experienced more intensely than comparable
gains (cf. Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997). If losses are
experienced no more intensely than comparable gains, then loss-
averse behavior is misguided on both monetary and affective
grounds (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006).
Diverse methods have been brought to bear on the question
of whether losses are experienced more intensely than gains.
Several studies have elicited self-reported emotional reactions
to hypothetical gains and losses, with mixed results. Galanter
(1990) asked subjects to fix a utility value to a focal event (e.g.,
assume winning a bicycle delivers 100 units of happiness) and
then to assign utilities to other events (e.g., winning money in
a lottery or paying a speeding ticket) based on that focal
benchmark. Consistent with experienced loss aversion, the im-
plied utility function was generally steeper for losses than for
equivalent gains, though the absolute difference in slopes
was small. However, Mellers, Schwartz, Ho and Ritov (1997)
did not observe such an asymmetry when eliciting reactions
to comparable gains and losses on a standard bipolar scale
(ranging from extremely disappointed to extremely elated).
McGraw et al. (in press) recently argued that losses are likely to
be rated as more impactful than comparable gains only when
losses and gains are compared and judged on a common scale.
For example, they asked participants to rate the hedonic impact
of a $200 gain and a $200 loss on a unipolar intensity scale
(ranging from no effect to very large effect). When participants
evaluated only the gain or only the loss, there was no evidence
of experienced loss aversion. However, when participants
evaluated both the gain and the loss, the loss was rated as
significantly more impactful, consistent with experienced loss
aversion.
One limitation of this prior work is that the “experienced”
outcomes were purely hypothetical. In an article titled “Loss
aversion is an affective forecasting error,” Kermer et al. (2006)
addressed this limitation with two experiments examining
whether real losses elicited larger changes in happiness than real
gains, and whether forecasts of hedonic responses correspond
with actual experience. Because the claim that loss aversion is a
forecasting error is provocative, and potentially important, the
data warrant heightened scrutiny. Kermer et al.'s (2006) first
experiment exposed subjects to a sequence of 44 intermixed
gains and losses that either resulted in a total net gain of $4 or a
total net loss of $4. Participants either experienced the outcomes
for real and then rated how they felt (experiencers) or simply
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feel if the outcomes were consequential (forecasters). Consis-
tent with loss aversion, forecasters predicted that the net loss
sequence would hurt about twice as much as the net gain
sequence would feel good. Experiencers, however, rated the
hedonic impact of the net loss sequence as about equal to the
hedonic impact of the net gain sequence, which supports the
argument that loss aversion is a forecasting error.
However, it is worth emphasizing that participants were not
reacting to a pure gain or pure loss, but rather to a sequence of
intermixed gains and losses. Thus, some people in the net loss
sequence probably ended on a positive note, and some people in
the net gain sequence probably ended on a negative note.
(Details about the sequences were not provided, so it is unclear
what percentage of net loss sequences concluded with a gain
and what percentage of net gain sequences concluded with a
loss.) If the next-to-last trial is the reference point by which the
last trial is judged, then the appropriate comparison is arguably
net loss sequences that concluded with a loss versus net gain
sequences that concluded with a gain.
In Kermer et al.'s (2006) second experiment, participants
were endowed with $5 and asked to imagine how their
happiness would be impacted by a coin flip that would either
result in a loss of $3 or a gain of an additional $5. Consistent
with loss aversion, participants predicted that the loss would
hurt nearly twice as much as the gain would feel good. The coin
was then flipped, and participants evaluated how happy they
were with the outcome. Although gains were as pleasurable as
predicted, losses were less painful than predicted. Losses and
gains had approximately equivalent effects on happiness (in
terms of magnitude). However, given that the loss was of
smaller magnitude than the gain (|−$3|b$5), the symmetric
hedonic impact of the gain and loss appears to be perfectly
consistent with loss aversion. Although both experiments
provide novel evidence that people are too pessimistic when
forecasting howmuch they would be bothered by losses (but see
Andrade & Iyer, 2009), this experiment did not dispute the
existence of experienced loss aversion. Thus, the data provide
only equivocal support for their title.
Neuroeconomists have complemented this research by bring-
ing physiological methods to bear on the question of whether
losses are experienced more intensely than equivalent gains.
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) conducted a study in which par-
ticipants made a series of choices between mixed (gain/loss)
gambles and sure amounts of money, and gambles were resolved
immediately after they were selected. Skin conductance, a
common measure of autonomic arousal, was measured immedi-
ately after each gamble was resolved. Consistent with experi-
enced loss aversion, the average skin conductance response
(SCR) per dollar lost was significantly greater than the average
SCR per dollar won. Other subjects were encouraged to bracket
their decisions broadly, focusing on “how your investments are
performing as a whole,” similar to a method previously shown to
reduce behavioral loss aversion (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler,
Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997). Consistent with this
prior work, Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) found that “thinking like
a trader” significantly reduced behavioral loss aversion, andeliminated the average SCR difference between dollars lost and
dollars won.
Similarly, Hochman and Yechiam (2011) found that pupil
dilation and heart rate was significantly greater in response to
losses than to equivalent gains, though, in contrast with Sokol-
Hessner et al. (2009), these autonomic responses did not predict
gamble choices. However, it is worth highlighting that subjects
in Hochman and Yechiam's paradigm chose between two
mixed gambles (e.g., gain 2x or lose 2x versus gain x or lose x).
The lack of correlation between autonomic responses and gam-
ble choices is thus less surprising, given that subjects could
not protect themselves from the possibility of loss.
Only a small amount of neuroscientific research has in-
vestigated the relative hedonic impact of comparable gains
and losses, and the experimental designs often did not permit
definitive conclusions. For example, Gehring and Willoughby
(2002) used electroencephalography (which involves attaching
electrodes to the scalp) to study neural reactions to gains and
losses, but soon after the experiment began subjects learned that
only the gains would actually influence their earnings (p. 2282).
Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale and Shizgal (2001) used
fMRI to measure responses to actual gains and losses, but none
of the gains and losses were of equal magnitude. Rutledge and
Glimcher (2009) recently conducted an fMRI study in which
participants experienced a series of gains and losses, and found
greater activation in several regions (e.g., amygdala) in response
to losses than to gains of equal magnitude, consistent with
experienced loss aversion.
General discussion
There is much we know about loss aversion, but questions
regarding its emotional underpinnings, its explanatory power, and
whether it reflects actual experience, remain open. Neuroeco-
nomics can potentially contribute important insights to these
ongoing debates. The relevant neuroeconomic research con-
ducted thus far is inconclusive regarding whether loss aversion is
the byproduct of a single system ormultiple systems, confirms the
important role of distress in generating the endowment effect, and
suggests that losses are actually experienced more intensely than
comparable gains.
More research is needed to address each debate, but
determining the underlying cause(s) of behavioral loss aversion
is perhaps the most promising avenue for future research. The
debate over the role of fear in loss aversion is at an early stage,
but fairly simmering already (e.g., De Martino et al., 2010; Tom
et al., 2007). Several methods could be brought to bear on this
debate. For example, it would be useful to examine whether
drugs that reduce amygdala activation (e.g., lorazepam; Paulus,
Feinstein, Castillo, Simmons, & Stein, 2005) moderate
behavioral loss aversion. Additionally, diffusion tensor imag-
ing, a relatively new technology that can reveal the connectivity
between neural regions, could offer insight into De Martino
et al.'s (2010) hypothesis that the amygdala conveys aversive
responses to the regions that demonstrated neural loss aversion
in Tom et al. (2007). For behavioral researchers, it would be
valuable to examine whether methods that tend to increase
7 Weisberg et al. (2008) found that neuroscience experts had the opposite
reaction: bad explanations were equally dissatisfying with and without
neuroscience information, but good explanations with neuroscience informa-
tion were significantly less satisfying than good explanations without
neuroscience information. The experts apparently realized that the neuroscience
information added nothing to the explanation, and were thus somewhat
annoyed with its presence. As familiarity with neuroscientific methods
increases in other fields, neuroscientific data that do not substantively add to
our understanding of phenomena may begin to face such boomerang reactions.
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Fedorikhin, 1999), moderate behavioral loss aversion.
Of course, beyond loss aversion, neuroeconomics has great
potential to shed light on the processes underlying many phe-
nomena of interest to consumer researchers (cf. Shiv, 2007).
The cost of fMRI is high, but that cost is most justifiable when
underlying processes are difficult to articulate, either because
they occur outside of awareness or because people are reluc-
tant to report the truth. Consider, for example, the moderately
positive relationship between price and perceived quality (e.g.,
Rao & Monroe, 1989). Imagine that an experimenter manip-
ulates only the price that participants are required to pay for
a consumable and then demonstrates a positive relationship
between price and self-reported pleasure of consumption. This
price placebo effect could be driven by actual treatment dif-
ferences in experienced pleasure. Alternatively, participants
may simply use prices to help make sense of an ambiguous
consumption experience. Dissonance reduction may also play a
role: the more people pay, the more they may be motivated to
report that what they paid for was of the utmost quality. It is
difficult to distinguish between these possibilities on the basis
of self-reports alone.
Plassmann et al. (2008) utilized fMRI to help shed light on
the price placebo effect. In their study, participants sampled
small amounts of Cabernet Sauvignon immediately after
learning that its retail price was either low or high (e.g., $10
or $90). The actual wine (delivered via a tube while participants
lay in the scanner) was held constant across low and high price
points. Plassmann et al. (2008) found that the wines were
reported as more pleasant when they were expensive. They also
found that activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC)
correlated positively with prices and with self-reported
pleasantness ratings. This was consistent with previous work
demonstrating a positive correlation between mOFC activation
and self-reported pleasantness ratings of odors, consumables,
and music. Most importantly, Plassmann et al. (2008) found that
prices did not predict activation in primary taste areas that
encode the actual sensory experience of consumption. The
results suggest that prices influence self-reported pleasure by
changing how the consumption experience is represented in
the brain, but not by directly influencing the basic, bottom-up
sensory components of pleasure.
Neuroeconomics promises to shed light on other underlying
processes that appear murky when viewed solely through the
lens of self-reports. However, when considering the promise of
neuroeconomics, it is also important to be aware of its
limitations. It is often difficult to draw causal conclusions from
any particular neuroeconomic study. fMRI data are correlational,
and it is often unclear whether the identified correlates are
actually driving the behavior in question or whether the neural
activity is merely a byproduct of the process that is actually
driving behavior. Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation,
which temporarily (and non-invasively) disrupts activation in a
particular region (creating a “virtual lesion”), is increasingly
used to examine the causal influence of the disrupted region
(e.g., Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006;
Knoch, Schneider, Schunk, Hohmann, & Fehr, 2009; Figner etal., 2010), but there is still uncertainty about how other regions
respond when the targeted region is disrupted, complicating
interpretation of the data. It is also difficult to draw causal
conclusions from traditional brain lesion studies, because no two
lesions are exactly alike, and it is typically unclear how the rest of
the brain has compensated for the damage.
Additionally, fMRI researchers are often forced to draw
“reverse inferences” from the data (Poldrack, 2006). Specific
cognitive or emotional processes are often inferred from acti-
vation in a particular region, which can be misleading when
that region is not selectively activated by a particular task or
process (Huettel & Payne, 2009; Yoon, Gonzalez, & Bettman,
2009). That is, when a region is unselectively activated by
many different processes, extreme caution is required when
using activation in that region to infer the engagement of a
particular process. Indeed, researchers are only beginning to be
able to use neural activation to predict which of several different
tasks (e.g., gambling decisions versus semantic judgments)
participants are performing in the scanner (Poldrack, Halchenko,
& Hanson, 2009).
Nevertheless, neural data seem to have a powerful placebo
effect on the persuasiveness of scientific arguments. For exam-
ple, Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson and Gray (2008) asked
students to read descriptions of several phenomena (e.g.,
curse of knowledge). Half of the participants received “good”
descriptions, which explained why the phenomenon occurs,
and half received “bad” descriptions, which simply restated
the phenomenon and provided no psychological insight. This
manipulation was crossed with a neuroscience information
manipulation: half of the descriptions included minimal
information about the neural correlates of the phenomenon,
which did not alter the underlying logic of the explanation itself
(e.g., “brain scans indicate that this “curse” happens because of
the frontal lobe brain circuitry known to be involved in self-
knowledge”), and half included no neuroscience information.
Participants rated the extent to which each description was
intellectually satisfying. Good explanations were equally satis-
fying with and without neuroscience information. Bad explana-
tions, however, were significantly more satisfying when
neuroscience information was present than when it was not.
The minimally informative neuroscience data essentially
rescued the bad explanations.7
Despite the limitations inherent in neuroscientific methods,
the fairly exploratory nature of the early neuroeconomics
research, and the tendency to overweigh neuroscientific find-
ings, it is difficult to be anything but optimistic about the
potential for neuroeconomics to shed light on phenomena of
interest to consumer researchers. In the domain of loss aversion,
461S. Rick / Journal of Consumer Psychology 21 (2011) 453–463behavioral researchers and neuroeconomists are already
generating complementary insights. However, the open ques-
tions about loss aversion considered in this review have yet
to be answered definitively. Conclusive answers will require
consumer researchers to be aware of the open questions and
controversies stemming from neuroeconomics, and vice versa.
This review is intended as a step in that direction.
Author's note
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